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Quoc Loc Hong, Amsterdam / the Netherlands* 
 
The Role of Courts in the War on Terror 
 
Abstract: The normative position of the judiciary under the traditional conception of democracy as 
self-legislation by the people is too weak to protect in an effective way the rights of suspects in the 
global War on Terror. Drawing on arguments elaborated by Hans Kelsen and Karl Popper, we shall 
attempt to devise in this paper an alternative democracy conception that could serve as a much more 
solid  foundation for  the  judicial  branch  of  government  in  a  democratic  state.  Through  this 
jurisprudential strategy, we hope to be able to maintain the balance of normative power among the 
Trias Politica, which, in turn, may contribute to the preservation of the legal rights of every person 
during the struggle against terrorists. 
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I. The Quicksand Basis of the Trias Politica 
Ever since the French Revolution, the event that inaugurated the codification of human and 
civil rights, the legal encroachment on these rights has been a common response by Western 
democracies to the emergence of security threats.
1 Given this historical pattern, we should not 
be surprised at all by the increasingly draconian measures to which governments in both the 
United States and the European Union (EU) resort in an attempt to ward off the dangers that 
have become apparent since the al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001. 
By and in itself, the restriction of rights for the sake of national security does not need to 
be problematic. If it could be established that restrictive measures were necessary to deal with 
emergency situations that may threaten either the state or its population, then democratic 
governments would be wholly justified in making recourse to them. The difficulty, however, 
is the general inclination among these governments to exaggerate the gravity of the dangers 
they have to face in order to legitimize the deprivation of rights that can only be legitimately 
deprived in real cases of emergency.
2 Governments, wrote Oren Gross in an article published 
shortly  before  September  11,  “tend  to  use  the  language  and  rhetoric  of  emergency  in 
                                                           
* Postdoctoral Fellow, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam, 2011. I would like to thank Professor Bart 
van Klink for his incisive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks also go to my colleague Jessica 
Lawrence for having edited its text. 
1 G. Agamben [K. Attell (transl)], The State of Exception (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 11-22.  
2 For recent surveys of the academic debate on the use of emergency powers, see, for instance, W. Scheuerman, 
“Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11” (2006) 14 (1) Journal of Political Philosophy 61-84 and D. 
Dyzenhaus, “Emergency, Liberalism, and the State” (2011) 9 Perspective on Politics 69-78.   2 
 
situations which may have a certain bearing on the state’s security interests, but which cannot 
be said to rise to the level of a real emergency.”
3 
Such  a  tendency  has  usually  led  to  unwarranted  rights  deprivation,  sometimes  on  a 
massive scale. The fate that befell Japanese Americans and Japanese citizens in the United 
States during the Second World War speaks volumes in this regard. As Giorgio Agamben has 
noted in his survey of emergency measures taken by the US government from the outbreak of 
the American Civil War in the nineteenth century to the War on Terror President George W. 
Bush recently initiated:  
 
“The most spectacular violation of civil rights (all the more serious because of its solely racial 
motivation)  occurred  on  February  19,  1942,  with  the  internment  of  seventy  thousand 
American  citizens  of  Japanese  descent  who  resided  on  the  West  Coast  (along  with  forty 
thousand Japanese citizens who lived and worked there).”
4 
 
Traditionally, the solution to this problem has been sought in the separation of powers. In 
order  to  avoid  the  illegitimate  deprivation  of  basic  rights,  it  is,  so  the  well-known  Trias 
Politica  doctrine  runs,  imperative  that  the  different  branches  of  government  both  operate 
separately from each other, and are authorized to keep each other in check. Rights, therefore, 
should only be restricted by laws the legislature has enacted and the actual enforcement of this 
restriction by the executive branch of government must, in turn, be subject to oversight by 
independent courts of law.
5 
The case can be made that the role played by the judiciar y is crucial in this institutional 
arrangement. As the mass internment of people of Japanese descent has clearly indicated, 
basic rights of unpopular minorities become extremely vulnerable once the state of emergency 
in a polity had been declared. In such a situation, elected members of both the legislative and 
executive branches would most likely be tempted by public opinion to strip such minorities of 
their rights, even though recourse to such a drastic measure may not be warranted by the 
polity’s actual conditions. As life-tenured officials who are not accountable to the electorate, 
judges, then, have the task of resisting the elected branches of government in order to prevent 
                                                           
3 O. Gross, “The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the 
‘Norm-Exception Dichotomy’” (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1858. 
4 Agamben, State of Exception, op cit n 1 supra, 22. See also T. T. Kunioka and K.M. McCurdy, “Relocation and 
Internment: Civil Rights Lessons from World War II” (2006) 39 (3) PS: Political Science and Politics 503-511. 
5 J. Madison, “The 51st Federalist Paper”, in A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1982), 261-265. 3 
 
them  from  yielding  to  those  majoritarian  sentiments  that  tend  to  prevail  during  times  of 
crisis.
6  
In the present paper, however, we shall argue that the legitimacy basis upon which the 
judiciary  could  offer this  institutional  resistance  is  shaky  at  best  within  the theoretical 
confines of democracy understood as popular self -legislation – the orthodox conception of 
democracy upon which the Trias Politica system has been founded. Its normative position 
under this conception of democracy, according to our argument, is too weak to protect in an 
effective way the rights of suspects in the global War on Terror that is being waged today.  
In order to strengthen the judiciary’s normative position, it is, then, necessary to replace 
the orthodox conception of democracy. After having explained why this conception is unable 
to provide a sufficiently firm foundation for courts of law, we shall, therefore, draw on a 
sustained discussion of arguments elaborated by Agamben, Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, 
Hans Kelsen and Karl Popper, to devise an alternative conception of democracy that could 
serve as a much more solid basis for the judicial branch of government in a democratic state. 
Through  this  jurisprudential  strategy,  we  hope  to  be  able  to  help  maintain  a  more  equal 
balance of normative power among the Trias Politica, which, in turn, may contribute to the 
preservation  of  the  legal  rights  of  every  person  during  the  worldwide  struggle  against 
terrorists. 
 
II. Judicial Power under Democracy as Popular Self-Legislation 
Democracy, as a general concept, refers to a system of government designed to preserve as 
much as possible the autonomy of all citizens who (have to) live under its jurisdiction.
7 It is 
based on the principle that everybody is free and equal, and that, therefore, nobody should 
possess the right to impose his or her will upon others.
8 The specific conception of democracy 
as self-legislation by the people attempts to accomplish this general  goal of  autonomy 
preservation through the principle of consent. “From the seventeenth century onward,” writes 
Robert Dahl, “the notion of consent was used to provide a moral foundation for the idea of a 
democratic state.”
9 Since the people include all citizens of such a state, only laws enacted with 
                                                           
6  G.  Gunther,  “Learned  Hand  and  the  Origins  of  Modern  First  Amendment  Doctrine:  Some  Fragments  of 
History” (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 725. 
7 I. Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3. 
8 J. Habermas [W. Rehg (transl)], Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2d Printing, 1999), 496. 
9 R. A. Dahl,  Toward Democracy: A Journey. Reflections: 1940-1997 (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental 
Studies Press, 1997), 445. 4 
 
the  consent  of  this  body  can  be  said  to  be  self-imposed  laws  that  would  not  violate  the 
autonomy of any individual.
10  
It may be wise to make clear from the outset that the consent account of democracy is not 
a straw man argument that tends to be invoked only by novices still uninitiated in political 
philosophy. The discourse theory of law and democracy Jürgen Ha bermas has elaborated in 
his massive Between Facts and Norms, for instance, is, if anything, the most sophisticated 
attempt  to  establish  that  this  traditional  conception  of  democracy  is  still  relevant  in  the 
marketplace of ideas today.
11 The principle of democracy, Habermas contends,  
 
“should establish a procedure of legitimate lawmaking. Specifically, the democratic principle 
states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent ...of all 
citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.”
12 
 
The sophistication of democratic theories like that of Habermas is what may have helped 
sustain the political primacy of both the legislative and executive branches of government. 
Precisely  because  members  thereof  are  usually  elected  by  law  subjects,  they  can  argue 
credibly that their legitimacy is rooted in the assent or consent the governed have given them 
at periodically held elections. This argument, in turn, enables them to assert that they have 
received from the people the mandate to take those measures they deem necessary for the 
well-being  of  the  polity  as  a  whole  during  their  terms  of  office.  When  they  decide  that 
particular restrictive measures are required to guarantee the survival of the democratic state, 
their decision would, therefore, appear at first sight to be legitimate, whereas attempts made 
by the non-elected judiciary to subject such a decision to control would seem to constitute an 
unwarranted interference in their rightful exercise of power.
13 This is especially true during 
times of war and other national crises, when courts of law come under enormous pressure to 
give deference to the drastic measures that elected government officials decide to enact in the 
name of national security and public safety.
14 The judiciary’s structural fragility in the face of 
such pressure was dramatically revealed by, for instance, the case of Korematsu v. United 
                                                           
10 A. Keenan, Democracy in Question: Democratic Openness in a Time of Political Closure (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 9. 
11 Cf. M. Rosenfeld, “Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and Rights” (1995) 108 Harvard 
Law Review 1163-1189. 
12 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, op cit n 8 supra, 179. 
13 Madison, “51st Federalist Paper”, op cit n 5 supra, 263: “But it is not possible to give to each department an 
equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.” 
14 O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?” (2003) 112 Yale 
Law Journal 1034. 5 
 
States,
15 in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided to approve the aforementioned internment 
of people of Japanese ancestry rather than to stand up for their basic rights.
16 
In the current War on Terror, the judiciary in both America and Europe has so far proved 
to be more willing to resist comparable attempts by the elected branches to render rightless 
those designated as suspects or “enemy combatants.” See, for instance, the decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
17 a decision that is widely 
interpreted as a judicial effort to block the strategy of rights deprivation pursued by the Bush 
Administration in the prosecution of this War.
18 “President Bush has,” in David Cole’s words, 
  
“authorized the National Security Agency to conduct warrantless wiretapping of American 
citizens,  despite  a  comprehensive  statute  that  makes  such  surveillance  a  crime.  He  has 
approved  the  “disappearance”  of  al-Qaeda  suspects  into  secret  prisons  where  they  are 
interrogated with tactics that include waterboarding, in which the prisoner is strapped down 
and made to believe he will drown. He has asserted the right to imprison indefinitely, without 
hearings, anyone he considers an ‘enemy combatant,’ and to try such persons for war crimes 
in ad hoc military tribunals lacking such essential safeguards as independent judges and the 
right of the accused to confront the evidence against him.”
19 
 
In Hamdam, the Court has ruled that these ad hoc tribunals are illegal. “Salim Hamdan, a 
citizen of Yemen, … was charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes by serving as Osama 
bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard, and by attending an al-Qaeda training camp.”
20 He was 
detained at Guantanamo Bay, where he would be tried in a military tribunal established by an 
executive order that President Bush issued at the end of 2001.
21 As Cole has pointed out, the 
rules governing a trial conducted before this tribunal are, if anything, draconian.
22 
 
“They permit defendants to be tried and convicted on the basis of evidence that neither they 
nor their chosen civilian lawyers have any chance to see or rebut. They allow the use of 
                                                           
15 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
16 For an apologetic defense of this decision by the sixteenth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, see W. H. 
Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: Knopf, 1998). See also A. C. Yen,  
“Introduction: Praising with Faint Damnation - The Troubling Rehabilitation of Korematsu” (1998) 40 Boston 
College Law Review 1-7 and M. Tushnet, “Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime” 
(2003) Wisconsin Law Review 273-307. 
17 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
18 D. Cole, “Why the Court Said No” (2006) LIII (13) New York Review of Books 41-43. 
19 Ibid, 41. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  6 
 
hearsay evidence, which similarly deprives the defendant of an opportunity to cross-examine 
his accuser. They exclude information obtained by torture, but permit testimony coerced by 
any means short of torture. They deny the defendant the right to be present at all phases of his 
own trial. They empower the secretary of defense or his subordinate to intervene in the trial 
and decide central issues in the case instead of the presiding judge. And finally, the rules are 
predicated  on  a  double  standard,  since  these  procedures  apply  only  to  foreign  nationals 
accused of acts of terrorism, not US citizens.”
23  
 
Precisely because of these draconian rules, the Court concluded that the military tribunal set 
up at Guantanamo Bay by the Bush Administration violates, among other things, the rights 
guaranteed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
24 Under the regime of this 
provision, detainees must be put on trial in a “regularly constituted court affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”  
A similar commitment to the protection of rights has been affirmed by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 2008 case concerning Mr. Yassin Abdullah Kadi and the Al 
Barakaat International Foundation.
25 In the Kadi case, the Court struck down an anti-terror 
regulation promulgated by the Council of the EU on the grounds that it had impermissibly 
infringed upon the fundamental rights of persons and entities designated as being “associated 
with  Osama  bin  Laden,  the  Al-Qaeda  network,  and  the  Taliban.”
26  Among  the  specific 
reasons the Court decided to invalidate  this regulation was the failure of the Council, its 
author, to include therein any procedures through which both Mr. Kadi and Al Barakaat could 
be informed of the incriminating evidence adduced against them.
27 As the ECJ put it, 
 
“Because the Council neither communicated to the appellants the evidence used against them 
to justify the restrictive measures imposed on them nor afforded them the right to be informed 
of that evidence within a reasonable period after those measures were enacted, the appellants 
were  not  in  a  position  to  make  their  point  of  view  in  that  respect  known  to  advantage. 
Therefore,  the  appellants’  rights  of  defence,  in  particular  the  right  to  be  heard,  were  not 
respected.”
28 
  
                                                           
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, 42. 
25 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005] E.C.R. II-3649. 
26 Council Regulation 881/2002. 
27 Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, 346. 
28 Ibid, 348. 7 
 
There are scholars and politicians in the West who claim that the effective enforcement of 
basic rights by independent courts of law is an asset rather than an impediment in the struggle 
against terrorism. Such enforcement would, according to them, render this struggle legitimate 
in the eyes of the world at large.
29 The question whether their claim is valid or not lies beyond 
the scope of the present paper.
30 But should we, for the sake of argument, assume the validity 
thereof, then it becomes necessary to strengthen the normative foundation of the judiciary in a 
democratic state. For however significant Hamdan and Kadi may be in the legal sphere, these 
decisions do not in any way enhance the jurisprudentially weak position of courts vis-à-vis the 
legislative and executive branches. The traditional democracy conception, with the consent 
principle at its core, still provides elected government officials with a decisive advantage in 
terms of legitimacy over non-elected judges.  
Since the normative weakness of the judiciary stems from the fact that judges are very 
often  appointed  and  life-tenured  officials,  whereas  legislators  and  key  members  of  the 
executive branch are electorally accountable power holders, one may be tempted to think that 
the democratic legitimacy of courts could be strengthened by an elected judiciary. But it 
would be a grave mistake to  yield to this temptation. The reason why the judiciary of a 
democratic state must be shielded from electoral politics is the generally valid assumption that 
insulation from majoritarian pressures would enable it to act as a countermajoritarian force in 
defense of minority rights.
31 If prospective members of the judiciary must rely on support 
from the majority to be voted into office, or if its incum bent members have to maintain the 
same kind of support in order to preserve their judicial position, then that would fatally 
compromise the ability of courts to protect minorities in general, and disliked minorities in 
times of crisis in particular.
32 Therefore, should we want to enable the judiciary to protect 
minority members like Japanese Americans during the Second World War or Muslims of 
Arab descent in Western societies today, then we must attempt to justify its power to defend 
them in terms of democratic theory, rather than trying to enhance the judiciary’s normative 
position  vis-à-vis  the  two  other  branches  of  government  through  the  device  of  elected 
judgeship. 
In  order  to  accomplish  this  justification,  it  is,  as  already  intimated,  imperative  that 
democracy understood as popular self-legislation be replaced by an alternative conception of 
                                                           
29 Cole, “Why the Court Said No”, op cit n 18 supra, 43. 
30 And the abilities of its author, for that matter. 
31 R. H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Touchtone, 1991), 5.  
32 Ibid: “Federal judges, alone among our public officials, are given life tenure precisely so that they will not be 
accountable to the people. If it were otherwise, if judges were accountable, the people could, when the mood 
seized them, alter the separation of powers, do away with representative government, or deny basic freedoms to 
those out of popular favor.” 8 
 
democracy  as  the  normative  basis  for  the  Trias  Politica  system.  Only  then  may  the 
jurisprudential case for judicial power become strong enough to allow courts to uphold in a 
structural way the principle that measures enacted by elected branches of government cannot 
escape  judicial  review,  even  though  “it  has  been  claimed  that  the  act  laying  them  down 
concerns national security and terrorism.”
33 
 
III. State of Nature and State of Exception 
The analysis of rightless life by the aforementioned Giorgio Agamben probably offers the best 
point of departure for our efforts to solidify the jurisprudential position of courts. Should we 
approach the rights deprivations to which democratic governments tend to resort from the 
perspective of his analysis, then we may understand the root cause behind this tendency, 
which, in turn, will enable us to devise a more persuasive justification for the judicial attempt 
to block it. 
“Bare life” is actually the term Agamben himself uses to designate life that is deprived 
the safeguard of all rights.
34 Under the laws of ancient Rome, this form of rightless life is 
embodied  by  the  homo  sacer.
35  To  summarize  Agamben’s  erudite  elaboration  on  this 
enigmatic figure in a very crude way,
36 homo sacer or sacred man was a man so impure that 
his killing did not constitute homicide. His life was beyond the protection of law. Everybody 
could, therefore, kill him without committing a crime.
37  
The fate of the homo sacer, Agamben argues, is a fate that would befall everybody in the 
world  today,  should  he  be  stripped  of  all  the  protection  afforded  by  legal  rights.
38  This 
argument, in turn, makes it possible for Agamben to arrive at a more nuanced interpretation of 
Thomas Hobbes’ theory on the origins of law. As is well known, the author of Leviathan 
sought to explain the advent thereof through a hypothetical state of nature, that is to say, a 
condition that is supposed to pervade in a literally law-less situation. If there is no sovereign 
who creates and enforces law in defense of everybody, then, so Hobbes reasoned, we all 
                                                           
33 Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, 343. 
34 G. Agamben [D. Heller-Roazen (transl)], Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1998). 
35 The concept of bare life has been rendered more explicit as rightless life by: P. Fitzpatrick, “Bare Sovereignty: 
Homo Sacer and the Insistence of Law”, in A. Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2nd Printing, 2005), 69. 
36 Agamben, Homo Sacer, op cit n 34 supra, 71. 
37 Ibid, 71-90. 
38  Cf.  N.  Werber,  “Die  Normalisierung  des  Ausnahmefalls:  Giorgio  Agamben  sieht  immer  und  überall 
Konzentrationslager” (2002) 56 Merkur 618-622. 9 
 
would be condemned to live in a permanent state of war, “where every man is Enemy to every 
man.”
39  
 
“In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and 
consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be 
imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such 
things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no 
Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”
40 
 
This all too familiar passage from Leviathan bears repeating in full here, because it helps 
drive  home  the  precarious  character  of  human  life  in  the  state  of  nature,  where  law  is 
completely absent. Under this law-less condition, it is possible for everybody to kill anybody 
without committing a murder and having to suffer the harsh punishment the commission of 
this crime would usually entail. The protection of life, which the criminalization of killing 
implies, can only take place once a legal order has been established.
41 “The Hobbesian state of 
nature,” therefore, “is not so much a war of all against all as, more precisely, a condition in 
which everyone is bare life and a homo sacer for everyone else…”
42 
Agamben next connects this insight to the state of exception, a concept developed by 
Carl Schmitt during the years of the Weimar Republic. The connection he forges between the 
law-less state of nature and Schmitt’s state of exception is what will ultimately enable us to 
understand  the  strong  inclination  among  democratic  governments  to  resort  to  rights 
deprivation to combat emergency situations - real or perceived. “The exception, which is not 
codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a 
danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and 
made to conform to a preformed law.”
43 Since the law is not able to determine in advance 
when and how this emergency situation will occur, and perhaps more importantly, what kind 
of  measures  should  be  taken  to  neutralize  it,  attention  must  necessarily  be  shifted  to  the 
question  as  to  who  ought  to  possess  the  competence  to  counter  such  a  threat  under  a 
                                                           
39 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (C. B. MacPherson ed., London: Penguin Books, 1981), 186. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid, 188. 
42 Agamben, Homo Sacer, op cit n 34 supra,106. 
43  C.  Schmitt  [G.  Schwab  (transl)],  Political  Theology:  Four  Chapters  on  the  Concept  of  Sovereignty 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 6. 10 
 
democratic constitution.
44 “The precise details of an emergency,” writes Schmitt, “cannot be 
anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is 
truly a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it is to be eliminated.”
45 In order to 
combat this state of exception, the authority designated to execute that task must be invested 
with the sovereign power to suspend the entire legal order, should such drastic a measure 
prove to be necessary.
46 After all, an order based on the rule of legal norms presupposes the 
existence of normal, that is to say, stable and predictable situations that can be regulated in 
advance.
47  A  state  of  exception,  however,  is  a  situation  that  is  inherently  chaotic  and 
unpredictable. Precisely for this reason, the authority charged with the neutralization thereof 
cannot be hampered at all by either constitutional norms or institutional controls.
48  
 
“The precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in such a case must 
necessarily be unlimited…The most guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate who 
can act in such a case…He decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what 
must be done to eliminate it.”
49 
 
Since the eventual elimination thereof may require that the entire legal order be suspended 
and “situational law” be created to respond to circumstances that cannot be anticipated,
50 the 
authority to deal with the state of exception could only be assigned to the highest power in the 
state.  Under  the  Constitution  of  the  democratic  Weimar  Republic,  that  power  is  the 
Reichspräsident, Schmitt argues.
51 Article 41 of this basic law stipulates that the President of 
the  Reich  be  elected  “by  the  whole  German  people,”  while  Article  48  grants  him  the 
competence to deal with emergency situations. As opposed to the judiciary that is merely 
appointed and unlike the legislature that is characterized by divisive struggles among political 
parties,  the  President,  so  Schmitt  continues,  is  elected  by  universal  suffrage  but  remains 
untainted  by  party  politics.  He,  therefore,  is  the  independent  political  authority  in  full 
possession of the popular mandate to decide on the life-and-death question as to whether the 
                                                           
44 Ibid, 10: “Who assumes authority concerning those matters for which there are no positive stipulations (…)? 
In other words, Who is responsible for that for which competence has not been anticipated?”  
45 Ibid, 7. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 13: “Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied 
and which is subjected to its regulations.” 
48 P. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997), 171-172. 
49 Schmitt, Political Theology, op cit n 43 supra, 7. 
50 Ibid, 13. 
51 C. Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, Vierte Auflage, 1996).  11 
 
state of exception has occurred and been overcome.
52 There is no need to subject the President 
to any form of checks and balances during the execution of this task, “because the unity of the 
people’s sovereign will is charismatically embodied within him and his emergency action is 
thus necessarily legitimate.”
53 
The  legal  and  jurisprudential  validity  of  Schmitt’s  argument  regarding  the  Weimar 
Constitution does not need to concern us here.
54 What is relevant to the present paper is his 
claim that the authority to decide on the state of exception amounts to the sovereign authority 
to suspend the whole existing legal order, as a result of which, “all the law that existed before 
does not apply anymore.”
55 This total suspension of law is, according to Agamben, what 
renders Schmitt’s state of exception virtually identical to the state of nature envisioned by 
Hobbes. Precisely because the rule of law has been suspended, everybody within a polity 
under the state of exception is again reduced to the unenviable status of the homo sacer in the 
law-less state of nature.  
Hobbes, to reiterate a familiar point, argued that the desire to terminate the war of all 
against all in the state of nature is the main reason why the rule of law has been established. In 
order to put an end to it, individuals who live in this condition decide to subject themselves to 
a sovereign power by means of a social contract concluded among all of them. The sovereign 
will offer them protection in exchange for their obeisance to him. Agamben now points out 
that the state of nature does not disappear after the contractual birth of the sovereign and the 
transformation of the prelegal condition into a polity governed by law. It continues to be 
operative in suspended form within the polity, for it is contained in the legal competence of 
the sovereign to put the polity under the state of exception, rendering it once again a law-less 
space.
56 This analysis thus permits the obvious claim that both demo cracy’s rule of law and 
“the legal black hole” established by the Bush Administration at Guantanamo Bay to detain 
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and try prisoners in the War on Terror share the same contractualist roots.
57 Through the 
creation  of  this  local  state  of  exception,  it  is,  in  any  case,  the  intention  of  the  Bush 
Administration to make the Guantanamo detainees as  rightless as the  homines sacri in the 
precontractual state.
58  
Viewed from the perspective of the contractualist theory of democracy,
59 it, then, starts 
becoming clearer why democratic governments are so inclined to deprive individuals of basic 
rights in order to fight emergency situations. Although the social contract is supposed to have 
transformed the law-less state of nature into a constitutional democracy, that transformation is 
not irreversible. The state of nature is still preserved within the figure of the sovereign 
through whose creation this law-less condition is supposed to have progressed into a legal 
order based on the consent of law subjects. At the apex of the democratic state, therefore, 
resides a dormant danger that its rule of law may fall back into the prelegal condition,  where 
persons were the mere embodiment of bare life. Whereas everyone was a  homo sacer for 
everyone else in the state of nature, all residents inside a democratic polity become rightless 
in the eyes of the sovereign once the state of exception has been declared.
60  
Thanks to this insight, the case can be made that the Trias Politica system is, in fact, an 
institutional attempt to prevent the suspended danger of regress from actually materializing. 
As John McCormick has pointed out in his Schmitt study, if there is no mechanism of mutual 
control, then the ordinary combat of emergency situations could easily degenerate into a total 
state of exception. The defense and restoration of normal conditions as they existed before the 
occurrence of the exception have been cited by Schmitt to justify the unlimited powers that 
the Reichspräsident ought to enjoy in the state of exception. “Such unlimited powers pertain 
both to his unfettered discretion as to whether an exception does, in fact, exists, as well as to 
what measures ought to be taken in order to counter the concrete threat.”
61 The problem 
inherent to the approach prescribed by Schmitt, however, is its built-in tendency to go astray. 
Once  it  is  accepted  that  the  President  should  possess  the  sovereign  right  to  wield  these 
exceptional powers, it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish the state of normalcy from 
the state of exception. “According to Schmitt’s formulation,” McCormick comments, 
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“in all cases of emergency, it would seem necessary to have recourse to a unitary institution 
with  a  monopoly  on  decisions,  so  that  no…  confusion  or  conflict  occurs.  Because  the 
likelihood of such an occurrence is great (especially in the Weimar context), and because the 
same figure who acts on the exception must first declare that it exists, it would seemingly be 
best to have such a person vigilant even during normal times. Thus... normalcy and exception 
are  collapsed,  and  ordinary  rule  of  law  is  dangerously  encroached  on  by  exceptional 
absolutism.”
62 
 
Schmitt’s  method,  in  other  words,  requires  that  the  competence  to  combat  the  state  of 
exception includes the competence to nip this danger in the bud. Since the state of exception, 
as Gross has pointed out, may occur at any given time and without any prior warning,
63 the 
authority assigned the task to combat it must, at any given moment, have th e unlimited 
powers as well to identify and eliminate such a danger before it could fully materialize. “What 
ought to count is not the actual occurrence of an exception, but rather the possibility of its 
taking place.”
64 This logic, then, is what probably constitutes the main explanation for the 
strong inclination among democratic governments to exaggerate the danger they have to face 
in order to justify the expansive scope of rights deprivation that can only be justified in real 
cases of danger.  
Despite its inherent tendency to degenerate into a wholesale violation of rights, many 
may still find appealing Schmitt’s prescription that the government official who has been 
assigned the task to fight emergency situations must also be granted the legal competence to 
determine  whether  such  an  emergency  situation  has  occurred.  McCormick,  however,  has 
made the case that contrary to what Schmitt seemed to think, it is far from necessary that the 
person who is authorized to decide whether an emergency situation has come into existence 
must be the same person as he who is entitled to decide what ought to be done in order to 
eliminate it. Under the Roman Republic, for instance, 
 
“it was the Senate that proclaimed an emergency: usually a foreign invasion, an insurrection, 
a plague, or a famine. It then asked the consuls to appoint a dictator, who could in fact be one 
of the consuls themselves. The dictator had unlimited power in his task, acting unrestrained 
by norm or law, while being severely limited beyond the specific task in that he could not 
change or perpetually suspend the regular order. Instead, he was compelled to return to it 
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through the functional nature of his activity and the time limit placed on him. However, in the 
performance of his duty, the dictator knew no right or wrong but only expedience…”
65 
 
The way in which the Roman Republic had institutionalized the use of emergency powers is, 
according to McCormick, politically superior to the strategy suggested by Schmitt. 
 
“The  genius  of  the  classical  notion  of  dictatorship…  is  this:  The  normal  institution  that 
decides that an exceptional situation exists (for instance, the Roman Senate) itself chooses the 
one who acts to address that situation (for instance, the dictator through the consuls). This has 
the obvious practical advantage that a collegial body of numerous members, like the Senate, 
commissions  a smaller body, such  as  the consuls,  to  appoint a single individual to more 
expediently deal with an emergency than could a multimembered body. But there are more 
subtle ramifications as well: For instance, the initiating institution cannot so readily declare an 
exception that it might in turn exploit into an occasion for the expansion of its own power, 
because emergency authority is placed in the hands of another institution. Moreover, given 
how jealous political actors are of the boundaries of their own authority, the fact that the 
normal institution decides to give up its own power in the first place will probably ensure that 
a real emergency exists. This technique also helps guarantee that an agent is chosen who is 
sufficiently trustworthy to relinquish power. This external authorization on the execution of 
emergency powers works simultaneously as a kind of check on, and compensation for, the 
relinquisher of power who declares an emergency, as well as a potentially astute selection 
device  for  the  executor  of  the  exception.  This  technique,  neglected  by  even  the  more 
sophisticated  formulations  of  emergency  provisions  in  modern  constitutions,  is  worth 
reconsidering.”
66  
 
It can be argued that the Trias Politica is based on exactly the same insight as was the Roman 
strategy for combating emergency situations - the insight that emergency or danger must be 
narrowly  defined  and  that  institutional  arrangements  to  effectively  resist  the  reckless 
expansion of its definition ought to be made.   
This insight is what may explain why the right to restrict rights must belong exclusively 
to the legislature. Being elected by citizens to constitute the sovereign body in a democratic 
state, legislators, after all, are dependent on the continuing support of the citizenry to retain 
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their office. In turn, this dependence would, arguably, prevent them from abusing their right 
to restrict the rights of citizens, lest they be removed from office by those same citizens at the 
next election.
67 
It has long been assumed that the legislature’s exclusive competence in matters of rights 
restriction would constitute a key safeguard for the basic rights. The fear of being voted out of 
office would dissuade them from enacting too expansive encroachments upon these rights. It 
is  through  this  electoral  mechanism  that  the  rule  of  law,  to  a  significant  extent,  can  be 
prevented from sliding back into the law-less state of exception, where - to reiterate the point - 
basic rights may be recklessly suspended in the name of national security and public safety.  
The case, however, can be made that this assumption is not tenable or valid anymore. 
Whereas  the  appointed  dictator  would  always  remain  subordinated  to  the  Senate,  the 
undisputed locus of sovereignty under the Roman Republic in its heyday,
68 the normative 
position of the executive branch in security matters is not necessarily weaker than that of the 
legislature under modern conditions of democratic politics. This  branch, after all, is not 
merely  composed  of  state  servants  charged  with  the  technical  task  of  implementing 
emergency laws enacted by the parliament. By virtue of the fact that they are often elected 
officials, leading members thereof can rely on their popular mandate to challenge the rule of 
established laws and the legislative monopoly of lawmakers in the struggle against possible 
threats to the polity and its population.
69 Arguably thanks to its democratic basis, the Bush 
Administration, for instance, was able to brush “aside legal objections as mere hindrances to 
the ultimate goal of keeping Americans safe.”
70 In order to prosecute its War on Terror, this 
Administration had, as previously alluded to, embraced the doctrine 
 
“that domestic criminal and constitutional law are of little concern because the President’s 
powers as commander in chief override all such laws; that the Geneva Conventions, a set of 
international treaties that regulate the treatment of prisoners during war, simply do not apply 
to the conflict with al-Qaeda; and more broadly still, that the President has unilateral authority 
to defy international law.”
71 
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The  progressive  democratization  of  politics,  which  demands  that  both  the  executive  and 
legislative branches of government be elected by all eligible citizens of a particular state, 
therefore,  seems  to  have  produced  an  exceedingly  corrosive  effect  on  the  legislature’s 
monopoly  to  encroach  upon  rights  and  the  corresponding  assumption  that  this  monopoly 
would safeguard those rights.
72  
There may be yet another reason why the legislature’s exclusive competence to restrict 
rights is no longer able to provide a sufficient level of protection to them: The fact that the 
real targets of emergency measures are often marginal figures whom the society at large may 
have come to regard with deep suspicion, if not outright hostility.
73 Precisely because persons 
actually targeted by their laws do not in any way pose an electoral threat to incumbent 
legislators, they have become much less reluctant to yield to  the executive branch’s demand 
for forever more draconian measures in the fight against terror and other security threats. 
Agamben even goes so far to suggest that the legislature has effectively degenerated into a 
rubber stamp for emergency measures the executive branch deems necessary.
74 “This means 
that  the  democratic  principle  of  separation  of  powers  has  today  collapsed  and  that  the 
executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power. Parliament is no 
longer the sovereign legislative body that holds the exclusive power to bind the citizens by 
means of the law: it is limited to ratifying the decrees issued by the executive power.”
75 
After having made this observation, Agamben moves on to lament: “At the very moment 
when  it  would  like  to  give  lessons  in  democracy  to  different  traditions  and  cultures,  the 
political culture of the West does not realize that it has entirely lost its canon.”
76 Agamben’s 
lament  strongly suggests  that this  loss is  just an unfortunate  aberration that has  occurred 
recently in the Occidental world - a Betriebsunfall or factory accident, so to speak.
77 His own 
analysis of Hobbes and Schmitt, however, has revealed that this is decidedly not the case. The 
partial absorption of legislative power by the executive branch, like the creation of a legal 
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black hole  at  Guantanamo  Bay, is  a development  that follows  directly from  the Western 
tradition  of  social  contract  theory  upon  which  the  dominant  conception  of  democracy  as 
popular self-legislation is founded.
78  
The consequence of this development, then, is that courts of law have, in fact, become 
the last institutional defender of basic rights.
79 Their Achilles heel, of course, is the imbalance 
of normative power between the elected legislative and executive branches of government on 
the one hand and the non -elected judiciary on the other. In order to keep hated o utsiders 
whom we have met in cases like  Korematsu, Hamdan and Kadi from becoming rightless, 
judges would have to stand up not only to a hostile public opinion, they would have to resist 
as well the enormous pressure coming from power holders who are elected by the majority of 
the electorate and whose emergency measures, therefore, seem to be democratically legitimate 
by virtue of that mere fact. 
Since there is no guarantee whatsoever that the judicial resistance in defense of basic 
rights  will  not  collapse  under  this  pressure,
80  it  is  imperative  that  the  position  of  the 
countermajoritarian judiciary vis-à-vis the majoritarian branches of government be made as 
strong as possible. In order to do so, we must, to start with, construct a new normative basis 
for the separation of powers. This means, to reiterate the point once again, that the traditional 
conception of democracy as popular self-legislation should be replaced by an alternative.   
 
IV. Democracy as Legislative Self-Restraint 
Despite the theoretical dominance of the traditional conception of democracy as popular self-
legislation, laws are never made by the people themselves.
81 They have always been enacted 
with the consent of either the majority of voters or that among their elected representatives. 
But in spite of the gap between theory and practice, majority legislation has been accepted as 
democratic, in the sense of self -imposed, in virtually every democratic polity from ancient 
Athens to present-day America.
82 
This acceptance may have been made possible by the well-known argument that majority 
rule is fundamentally consistent with the autonomy of outvoted minority members. Under a 
democratic system  -  it has been argued by political theorists in the West  -  the defeated 
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minority is not permanently deprived of the right to make its own laws. Rather, it is given a 
chance to become a new majority and to achieve that aim at a later moment in the cycle of 
periodically  held  elections.  Implicit  in  the  right  of  every  citizen  to  participate  in  the 
democratic process, in other words, is the right of the vanquished minority to continue its 
efforts to transform into laws its political designs for society as a whole through the process of 
majority formation. The legally guaranteed right of minority members to carry on the struggle 
for  legislative  power,  and  the  inherent  right  to  win  it  at  the  end  of  the  day,
83  are what 
constitute the key distinction between democratic majoritarianism and the tyranny of the 
majority. Democracy as popular self-legislation, therefore, amounts in the daily practice of 
political life to  a system of government in which the majority of either eligible citizens or 
elected legislators are entitled to govern the whole state through the laws that they enact, on 
the condition that members of the oppositional minority are granted a legally institutionalized 
opportunity to transform themselves into a new legislative majority. 
The theoretical device that underlies this whole argument in defense of majority rule is 
the social contract. Laws enacted by the majority could, according to social contract theory, 
be construed as self-imposed laws, if it could be assumed that the majority principle has been 
unanimously accepted at the contractual creation of the democratic state by those who 
henceforth are going to be governed by such laws. In a democracy understood as popular self-
legislation, this initial unanimity is what constitutes the source of legitimacy for majority 
legislation. “In fact, if there were no earlier agreement, how… could there be any obligation 
on the minority to accept the decision of the majority,” Rousseau rhetorically asked in The 
Social Contract.  
 
“What right have the hundred who want to have a master to vote on behalf of the ten who do 
not? The law of the majority-voting itself rests on an agreement, and implies that there has 
been on at least one occasion unanimity.”
84 
 
Implicit in the contractualist case for majority rule is, as we can see, the acknowledgement 
that  unanimous  consent  to  the  enactment  of  laws  is,  in  fact,  the  only  way  to  secure  the 
political autonomy of every law subject. Unforced unanimity, as Robert Burt has pointed out, 
is  the  only  legitimate  basis  for  an  equal  relationship  among  all  polity  members.
85  The 
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problem, however, is that this state is almost impossible to obtain in practice. “Unanimous 
consent,” he continues, “is itself… not a working rule that satisfies democratic principles so 
long as one dissenter, by withholding consent, can impose his will on others.”
86 The majority 
principle, therefore, must be accepted as the second best strategy to approach the ideal of 
popular self-legislation. 
  This conventional justification of the majority principle has been challenged by Hans 
Kelsen,
87  a  legal  philosopher  who  was  Schmitt’s  main  intellectual  opponent  during  the 
Weimar years. His alternative defense of this principle is what may give rise to the new 
democratic foundation for the Trias Politica that we are looking for. 
In his theory of democracy, Kelsen also seeks to reconcile the principle that every citizen 
in a democracy is politically autonomous with the fact that laws in such a polity are usually 
enacted by the majority. A politically autonomous individual is, in Kelsen’s view, one who is 
only subject to the laws that he or she has enacted him- or herself and not to those made by 
others. The fact, however, is that virtually nobody is autonomous in this sense when he or she 
enters the world. Everyone is born into a legal order that already exists, a legal order that one, 
for obvious reasons, could not have helped to create but that one is nevertheless compelled to 
obey. Thus, from the very moment of their birth, citizens are already ruled by laws that others 
have enacted before they have the opportunity to enact their own laws themselves. They are, 
in other words, already governed before they get the chance to be governors. In order to be 
politically autonomous, each of these citizens must, therefore, have the possibility to abolish 
or amend the legislative decisions that others have taken and that he or she does not like.
88 Or 
to reverse Rousseau’s famous aphorism,  man was not born free but tends to be born “in 
chains” so his liberation must be the ultimate aim of democratic politics.
89 The essence of 
political autonomy, then, is not primarily the ability to make one’s own laws, but rather the 
capacity  to  replace  laws  that  others  have  made  with  self-legislation.  Viewed  from  this 
perspective, from the perspective of those who want to liberate themselves by changing the 
existing legal order, the majority principle constitutes, Kelsen points out, the shortest route to 
their goal. Under the reign of this principle, the number of votes that those who want to 
achieve legal change are required to get is considerably smaller than it would have been the 
case if unanimity were the principle by which the game were played. It is true that, viewed 
from the perspective of democracy understood as popular self-legislation, an individual could 
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only be considered as really autonomous if the legal norms governing him or her were enacted 
on the basis of unanimity. The drawback of the unanimity principle would, however, reveal 
itself in a dramatic manner at the moment that amendments to these norms had to be made. It 
would, then, turn out that change in the legal regime would be virtually impossible to achieve 
if unanimous consent were required.
90 
 
“Here we see a highly peculiar ambiguity of the political mechanism. That which earlier, at 
the founding of the state order, served to protect individual freedom..., becomes its shackle if 
it is no longer possible to escape the order.”
91 
 
Kelsen,  therefore,  concludes  that  it  is  the  majority  principle,  rather  than  the  unanimity 
principle, which is most conducive to the right to self-determination that every citizen in a 
democratic  state  is  entitled  to  enjoy.  The  fact  that  majority  legislation  is  accepted  as 
democratic  could,  on  the  basis  of  this  conclusion,  no  longer  be  attributed  solely  to  the 
impossibility to accomplish unanimity in practice. The acceptance thereof may be based as 
well on the insight that under the majority principle, citizens are actually more politically 
autonomous than under the unanimity principle, which means that it is much easier for them 
to escape from the laws that others have enacted and to make their own laws themselves.  
In light of Kelsen’s reinterpretation of the majority principle, we can argue that this 
principle  should  primarily  be  viewed  as  a  mechanism  of  liberation  that  enables  minority 
members to break free from the alien will expressed in the laws that others have imposed 
upon them, rather than as a device through which the familiar ideal of popular self-legislation 
could be realized. This, in turn, suggests that the legitimacy of majority legislation could be 
established on the basis of a conception of democracy other than the traditional one. Within 
the  framework  of  that  alternative  conception,  laws  promulgated  by  the  majority  are 
considered legitimate, not because they can ultimately be traced back to the consent of the 
minority  that  opposes  their  promulgation,  but  rather  because  the  majority  principle  in 
accordance with which they are promulgated boils down to the relatively easiest way via 
which  members  of  the  out-voted  minority  can  liberate  themselves  from  these  laws  by 
changing them. 
The essence of this alternative conception is, in fact, already discernible in the argument 
that law’s democratic legitimacy resides in the opportunity law subjects have to accomplish 
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their liberation therefrom: This opportunity must be granted to them by those who happen to 
possess the power to impose it upon them in the first place. The changes in the existing legal 
order can, in other words, only be accomplished through the process of majority formation 
discussed above if governing lawmakers are willing to permit those who are subject to their 
laws to amend them. The willingness of incumbent law authors to allow law addressees to 
achieve liberation from laws that are imposed upon them could, then, be construed to signify 
an exercise of self-restraint on the part of these law authors, which means that they do not 
intend to make their legislative imposition upon others permanent. Quite the contrary, they 
intend  to  provide  those  who  are  subject  to  that  legal  regime  the  opportunity  to  escape 
therefrom through the majority formation process. If self-restraint by law authors toward law 
addressees  is  what  makes  laws  democratically  legitimate, then we may call  a democracy 
within the normative framework of which the legitimacy of laws is conceived in terms of 
amendments that law subjects could make to these laws democracy understood as legislative 
self-restraint.
92 Since this conception of democracy requires that law authors make it possible 
for law addressees to amend or abolish the laws to which they are subject through the process 
of majority formation in order to render these laws legitimate, we may, on the basis of what 
has been discussed above, define democracy so understood as follows: It is a political system 
in which the majority among the polity’s demos is entitled to govern the whole polity through 
the laws that it enacts, on the condition that defeated minority members are granted a legally 
guaranteed opportunity to become members of new legislative majorities.  
This  definition  of  democracy  corresponds  neatly  to  the  way  democratic  government 
works in practice. The rationale behind that familiar practice, however, has changed. The 
legally  institutionalized  circulation  of  majorities  and  minorities  is  no  longer  intended  to 
approach  the  ideal  of  popular  self-legislation,  but  to  make  possible  the  liberation  of  law 
subjects. 
 
V. A New Balance of Normative Power 
Kelsen’s reinterpretation of the majority principle and the related argument that legal norms 
owe their democratic legitimacy to the  ease with  which they  could  be either changed or 
nullified  have  not  been  able  to  convince  everybody  in  the  community  of  legal  theorists. 
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Wocjiech  Sadurski,  for  instance,  is  particularly  critical  of  the  way  in  which  Kelsen  has 
attempted to establish the democratic credentials of legislation promulgated on the basis of 
that principle. “While it is an important virtue of a democratic law-making system that it 
leaves open the avenues for the revisions of enacted laws, it would be ironic,” he elaborates, 
 
“to see the sources of political autonomy (as it was ironic to see the sources of legitimacy of 
laws) in the ease of the repeal of disliked laws. I find it an unattractive conception of political 
freedom  to  be  told  that,  while  the  laws  which  govern  my  behavior  are  repulsive  (ex 
hypothesi), I can nevertheless work towards repealing them, and the repeal is easier than in 
any  other  alternative  system  of  law-making.  This  sounds  to  me  like  an  excessively  thin, 
negative, and defensive account of what political autonomy is grounded in.”
93 
 
But Kelsen is not alone in adopting this via negativa to democracy. His alternative theory of 
democratic legislation, after all, shares a remarkable similarity with the theory of democracy 
advanced by Karl Popper, who, like Kelsen, was a Jew that had to flee from Europe because 
of the massive rights deprivation committed by the Nazis. As is the case with Kelsen, Popper 
goes out of his way to emphasize that democratic legitimacy is to be generated in a negative 
way. The democratic essence of a government resides, according to him, precisely in the 
legally institutionalized opportunity that the governed possess to dismiss their governors.
94 It 
is through the threat of dismissal that citizens of a democratic polity may be able to influence 
the actions of those who rule them, he contends.
95  
The  negative  approach  de fended  by  Kelsen  and  Popper  arguably  constitutes  an 
alternative tradition of democracy in the West, one which has long been overshadowed by the 
more  affirmative  doctrines  elaborated  by,  for  instance,  Habermas.  The  conception  of 
democracy as legislative self-restraint whose existence was theorized in the preceding section 
is nothing but a logical product of the Kelsen -Popper school. Should we look at the relation 
between the judiciary and the legislature from the perspective of this conception, then it 
would become clear that the position of appointed judges  vis-à-vis elected lawmakers has 
become significantly stronger in terms of legitimacy.  
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 Democracy as legislative self-restraint, after all, gives rise to the insight that the main 
source of law’s legitimacy has been relocated from authorship by the people to the liberation 
of law subjects.  This implies, in the first place, that legislators who comprise the majority 
faction  can  no  longer  claim  to  have  received  from  the  people  the  mandate  to  take  the 
measures  they  take.  They  will  have  to  legitimize  their  laws  themselves  through  the 
institutionalized respect they show for the political autonomy of minority members. 
The second and related implication is that the jurisprudential basis upon which judges 
could offer resistance to the prevailing majority has become much more solid. The insight that 
the  democratic  legitimacy  of  majority  legislation  depends  on  the  process  of  majority 
formation by minority members arguably requires that the judicial branch be authorized to 
invalidate legislation that members of the incumbent majority may be tempted to enact (a) to 
obstruct the electoral process by means of which they themselves could be removed from 
office by the oppositional  minority or (b) to  violate the rights  of permanent  minorities.
96 
Permanent minorities, it should be pointed out, are minorities so hated or so unpopular among 
the rest of society “that they are virtually excluded from all attempts at coalition building,” 
which means that they are “unable to marshal enough votes to protect their interest.”
97 Since it 
is obvious that these minorities cannot escape from “the whims of the ‘majority’,” to which 
they may be subjected through the process of majority formation,
98 the case could be made 
that courts should be entitled to shield them from the laws that the majority decides to enact at 
their expense. After all, if the democratic legitimacy of majority legislation depends  on the 
ability of a minority to become a new majority, then the mere existence of minorities who are 
not able do so may cast a shadow of illegitimacy over the rule thereof. Hence the argument  
that the judiciary ought to possess the authority to protect these minorities against laws the 
hostile majority may want to impose upon them.
99 
Judges  could  also  act  as  defenders  of  the  electoral  process  and  as  protectors  of 
defenseless  minorities  under  the  traditional  conception  of  democracy  as  popular  self -
legislation.
100 But in that case, the democratic basis for their action will always remain weaker 
than that of the legislative branch. Precisely because election by the “people” is what gives 
legislators the right to make laws, they are in possession of a decisive legitimacy advantage 
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over non-elected judges within the normative framework of this conception of democracy. 
Laws they enact will, as previously noted, always appear to be democratically legitimate at 
face value, whereas  the judicial invalidation  of legislation often tends  to  be perceived as 
inherently  undemocratic.  Legislators,  however,  would  no  longer  be  able  to  enjoy  this 
advantage if democracy were understood as legislative self-restraint. For, under that scenario, 
they would have to generate the legitimacy of the laws they promulgate through their own 
conduct, which would make it much easier for us to defend the resistance that the judiciary 
must offer them in order to protect the basic rights of minority members. 
Basic  rights  -  freedom  of  speech  and  freedom  of  association  in  particular  -  are  the 
instruments upon which the minority must rely to transform itself into a new majority. When 
judges strike down laws that are deemed to have violated these rights, they may have thwarted 
the will of the incumbent majority. But their action is consistent with the majority principle 
itself. In doing so, after all, they are safeguarding the cyclical process of majority formation 
upon  which  the  democratic  legitimacy  of  majority  legislation  depends:  If  this  process  is 
somehow obstructed, then majority legislation will cease to be democratically legitimate. The 
obvious argument to be made, then, is that the legislative majority may actually need the 
institutional resistance offered by the judiciary in order to bestow democratic legitimacy upon 
the laws it enacts. In other words, it is through the judicial protection of minority rights that 
majority rule can be rendered democratically legitimate. 
This basic argument is precisely what gives rise to a new balance of normative power 
among the three branches of government, which, in turn, will strengthen the jurisprudential 
position of the judiciary in its attempt to prevent the democratic rule of law from descending 
into the law-less state of exception during the fight against terror. Being the guardian of the 
basic rights that elected power holders in general must respect, lest they forfeit their claim to 
democratic legitimacy, the judiciary can now unabashedly demand that  they  explain why 
particular rights have to be infringed upon in order to secure public safety. Through this 
demand for accountability, judges may be able to limit the deprivation of rights by either the 
legislative or the executive branch to real cases of emergency, when such a deprivation is 
warranted. 
It is true that terror cases like Hamdan and Kadi often involve suspects who are not 
citizens of the democratic state where they have to stand trial. But that does not mean that the 
judiciary should not act vigorously to enforce their basic rights. After all, if judges are able to 
ensure  that  even  alien  suspects  do  not  become  rightless  in  a  democratic  polity,  then  the 
citizens thereof can rest assured that their own rights will be well protected by courts of law, 25 
 
should the need for such protection arise. The conception of democracy as legislative self-
restraint would thus yield a dialectic interplay between the basic rights of citizens and those of 
aliens. As the normative power of the judiciary to protect the rights of citizens would become 
stronger under this alternative conception of democracy, judges would be in a much firmer 
position to safeguard the rights of aliens – a development that, in turn, would significantly 
enhance the protection of the rights enjoyed by citizens of a democratic state.  
The jurisprudentially more solid position that judges would possess under the conception 
of  democracy  as  legislative  self-restraint  obviously  would  not  guarantee  that  they  would 
actually stand up to either elected government officials or public opinion in defense of the 
basic  rights  to  which  terror  suspects  are  entitled.  In  light  of  the  historical  record,  Bruce 
Ackerman, for instance, remains quite skeptical about the judiciary’s role as protector of these 
rights. “Korematsu,” he reminds us,  
 
“has never been formally overruled, a fact that has begun to matter after September 11. Even 
today, the case remains under a cloud. It is bad law, very bad law, very, very bad law. But 
what will we say after another terrorist attack? More precisely, what will the Supreme Court 
say if Arab Americans are herded into concentration camps? Are we certain any longer that 
the wartime precedent of Korematsu will not be extended to the ‘war on terrorism’?”
 101 
 
Rather than relying “somewhat unrealistically” on courts to safeguard basic rights through the 
trial of individual cases,
102 Ackerman seeks to accomplish a more general protection for them 
through a legislative mechanism called the supermajoritarian escalator. In order to prevent the 
fight against emergencies by the executive branch  from running amok, it should only be 
authorized by the legislature to act unilaterally for a short period of two or three months.
103 
The support of a simple majority among lawmakers is enough for this initial period.
104 The 
continuation thereof, however, “should require an escalating cascade of supermajorities: sixty 
percent for the next two months; seventy for the next; eighty thereafter.”
105 
By means of this requirement, the exceptional emergency regime could be put “on the 
path to extinction,” Ackerman argues.
106 “As the escalator moves to the eighty-percent level, 
everybody will recognize that it is unrealistic to expect this degree of legislative support for 
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the indefinite future. Modern pluralist societies are simply too fragmented to sustain this kind 
of politics -unless, of course, the terrorists succeed in striking repeatedly with devastating 
effect.”
107 
Despite  the  fact  that  he  has  presented  the  supermajoritarian  escalator  as  a  more 
democratic alternative to judicial oversight, Ackerman’s legislature-centered argument is, in 
fact, based on exactly the same normative premise as is the case we have made for courts of 
law: The right of minority members to oppose or even resist the majority’s policy preferences. 
When judges invalidate as illegal an emergency measure promulgated by the majority, they 
do so in the name of this right. That can be said as well of the progressively decreasing 
number of lawmakers who would have to veto the extension of similar measures under the 
institutional arrangement designed by Ackerman.
108 For this reason, either the former or the 
latter could be expected to face the same majoritarian pressures originating from politics and 
society. Hence the conclusion that democracy as legislative self -restraint should in any case 
be adopted as the legitimacy basis of the Trias Politica, regardless of the question whether the 
judiciary or the cyclically shrinking minority in the legislature would eventually become the 
main guardian of basic rights in the Age of Terror. 
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